Joint Research Report
French Elections 2022
The French information ecosystem put to the test
A report by the Online Election Integrity Watch Group
Download the full reportExecutive summary
In April 2022, French voters elected the President of the Republic for a five-year term, followed by legislative elections in June to select representatives for the National Assembly. The election campaigns were heavily influenced by the COVID-19 pandemic and the war in Ukraine, shifting focus away from the candidates’ policies. The presidential election saw the collapse of traditional parties, such as the Socialist Party (PS) and the Republicans (LR), a fragmented left, the emergence of two far-right candidates, and a late, controversial campaign entry by Emmanuel Macron, resulting in notable public discontent with his leadership.
The June legislative elections were framed as a “third round” by the left. An alliance, the Nouvelle Union Populaire, Écologique et Sociales (NUPES), formed between the Green Party, PS, and La France Insoumise (LFI) after the presidential election, aimed to balance Macron’s re-election power. The results were surprising: NUPES secured 131 seats, the far-right National Rally (RN) surged from 8 to 89 seats, and LR declined to 61 seats, leaving Macron’s party with 245 seats. The government’s failure to secure an absolute majority led to a political crisis, rendering France nearly ungovernable due to the rise of opposition from political extremes.
The Information System Under Strain
These elections were a fertile ground for online influence operations by domestic and foreign actors, similar to those seen in previous elections in France, the US, and Germany. A group of civil society researchers monitored online content in real-time, focusing on disinformation, hate speech, political ads, and the algorithmic amplification of candidates. Inspired by the Election Integrity Partnership in the US, and following the recommendations of the Les Lumières à l’ère numérique report, this group aimed to alert authorities, media, and citizens about information manipulation campaigns that could undermine election fairness.
Troubling online content and behavior were observed, such as questioning opinion poll validity and vote counts. We also saw violations of online platform terms of use, including astroturfing and coordinated inauthentic behavior by the far right. These narratives and strategies, part of the contemporary political landscape, evolve with regulations and will require ongoing attention during major democratic events.
Limited Impact of Disinformation
Despite these challenges, the destabilizing attempts had limited impact in 2022, a positive sign for French democracy but warranting future caution.
We propose four hypotheses for the resilience of the French information ecosystem. First, the war in Ukraine redirected Russian resources, reducing foreign interference. The ban on Russian state-controlled media outlets like Sputnik and RT from major online platforms weakened their influence in France.
Second, government actions on disinformation may have heightened platform vigilance and discouraged malicious actors. France’s presidency of the Council of the European Union during the finalization of the Digital Services Act (DSA), setting platform responsibilities for illegal content, made it a sensitive issue. The launch of Viginum (Vigilance and Protection against Foreign Digital Interference Agency) and Arcom’s (Audiovisual and Digital Communications Regulatory Authority) awareness campaigns underscored institutional commitment to tackling disinformation.
French election regulations also hinder large-scale disinformation spread. Factors included political figures supporting top poll candidates to obtain necessary signatures, lack of remote voting, extensive polling stations, and regulated political advertising.
Finally, the centralised French media space, controlled by traditional media with a shared respect for institutions, limited disinformation spread. Presidential candidates, except for one notable case, did not question election validity despite expressing dissatisfaction. However, this centralization has been criticized by far-left and far-right movements, raising sustainability concerns.
Future Threats to Institutions
While the 2022 disinformation attempts did not succeed, the threat remains. Traditional and centrist narratives are losing ground to extremist views online, reflecting growing distrust in government and institutional narratives.
Our report offers technical recommendations to safeguard the French online information ecosystem. These measures can limit malicious actors’ ability to destabilize democracy but cannot prevent the rise of anti-system narratives, highlighting the need for ongoing political and ideological debates.
Acknowledgement:
Major elections are often an opportunity for major social media services to update their terms of use. Indeed, civil society and regulators have stronger scrutiny on their reactivity to close some of their vulnerabilities to the latest forms of information manipulation.
In its goal to stop Big Tech companies from profiting off public harm, Reset Tech was interested in equipping its network of partners with tools to monitor electoral interference and ways to counter it. The 2022 French presidential and parliamentary elections sequence provided an opportunity to leverage Open Terms Archive to that aim.
Thanks to Reset Tech funding, a dedicated Open Terms Archive instance was set up to track documents for the 5 most used social media in France that could have a systemic impact on the elections. Features were added to the engine to track the dozens of documents that make the platforms “Community Guidelines”. And a human analysis of important changes over email was published in two languages.